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Note
The Privileged Physician and Medical Malpractice:
Why a Qualified Expert Testimonial Privilege Should
Not Apply to Defendant Treating Health Care
Providers
KEVIN V. SWEENEY
In Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, the Connecticut Appellate
Court recognized a qualified expert testimonial privilege that precludes discovery
of an unretained expert’s opinion. That decision threatens to eliminate relevant and
irreplaceable testimony of defendant treating health care providers in medical
malpractice cases. The Appellate Court set forth a balancing test to determine if a
party can overcome the qualified privilege as applied to a particular unretained
expert: (1) whether the expert reasonably should have expected to be called upon
to provide opinion testimony in subsequent litigation; and (2) whether there exists
a compelling need for expert opinion testimony in the case.
This Note analyzes the balancing test set forth in Redding as applied to
defendant health care providers who participated in the treatment relevant to
malpractice litigation. First, this Note considers whether the need for defendant
health care providers’ testimony should overcome the Redding qualified testimonial
privilege. Second, this Note explores whether the testimonial privilege violates
Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery as applied to defendant health care
providers’ deposition testimony.
Part I begins by discussing the risk of losing the expert opinion testimony of
defendant treating physicians in medical malpractice litigation, addressing
Connecticut’s requirements for expert testimony of treating physicians and the
unique role of defendant health care providers. Part II presents a compelling need
for defendant health care providers’ expert testimony in medical malpractice
litigation, balancing the rights of expert witnesses to be free from testifying with the
needs of courts and litigants for their evidence. Part III concludes by challenging
the application of a qualified expert testimonial privilege to the discovery stage of
medical malpractice litigation, considering the practical difficulties imposed by the
Redding privilege in light of Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery.
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The Privileged Physician and Medical Malpractice:
Why a Qualified Expert Testimonial Privilege Should
Not Apply to Defendant Treating Health Care
Providers
KEVIN V. SWEENEY *
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your mother suddenly falls ill. She begins experiencing
excruciating chest pain, shortness of breath, and fatigue. A cardiologist
discovers an abnormal accumulation of fluid and swelling around your
mother’s heart and diagnoses her with “pericarditis.” You and your mother
consult with the cardiologist to assess her treatment options. The cardiologist
informs you and your mother that a conservative treatment of
anti-inflammatory medications is an option but instead recommends
immediate surgical intervention. Your mother trusts the cardiologist and
agrees to go forward with the operation.
A nurse escorts your mother into the operating room where the
cardiologist awaits. The cardiologist then begins operating. After hours of
anticipation, a nurse notifies you that the operation has come to an end. The
cardiologist soon arrives to provide the tragic news that the surgery was
unsuccessful and your mother has passed away.
Heartbroken and angry, you consult with an attorney about the loss of
your mother. The attorney advises you to file a lawsuit alleging medical
malpractice against her treating cardiologist. Desperate for answers, you do
so on behalf of your mother. It is now the discovery stage of litigation—an
opportunity for your attorney to inquire about your mother’s medical
treatment and the events leading up to her death. Your attorney promptly
schedules a deposition with the defendant cardiologist who treated your
mother.
During the defendant’s deposition, your attorney ascertains the facts of
your mother’s treatment—which examinations the cardiologist relied upon,
the cardiologist’s diagnosis, the procedures the cardiologist employed
during your mother’s operation, and the result of the operation. But the
cardiologist limits all deposition testimony to the facts of your mother’s
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2020; Purdue University, B.A. 2016.
This Note is dedicated to the trial lawyers who encouraged me to consider this issue and the surrounding
areas of the law. Many thanks to my professors and colleagues for supporting the development of this
Note, and to the Connecticut Law Review for facilitating its production. Any errors or omissions are my
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treatment and claims a privilege from providing medical opinion testimony.
Your attorney is unable to discover the cardiologist’s medical opinion as to
why immediate surgical intervention was recommended, the standard of care
owed to your mother throughout treatment, or the cause of your mother’s
death. As a result, your attorney must postpone the deposition for the court
to determine whether the defendant cardiologist’s expert opinion testimony
should be privileged from discovery and, if so, which particular questions
would prohibitively call for such testimony.
The pattern described above is now a common occurrence in
Connecticut medical malpractice litigation. During the discovery stage of
litigation, there is generally no issue when litigants compel defendant
treating health care providers to provide factual testimony as to the relevant
treatment they provided. However, defendant parties frequently pursue
protective orders to preclude compelling opinion testimony from these
treating health care providers. The Connecticut Appellate Court (Appellate
Court) recently approved this practice by recognizing an evidentiary
privilege for unretained experts.
In Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding (Redding), the Appellate
Court recognized a qualified expert testimonial privilege that precludes
discovery of an unretained expert’s opinion.1 That decision threatens to
eliminate the most relevant and irreplaceable testimony in medical
malpractice cases when applied to defendant treating health care providers.
The Appellate Court set forth a balancing test to determine if a party can
overcome the qualified privilege as applied to a particular unretained expert:
(1) whether the expert reasonably should have expected to be called upon to
provide opinion testimony in subsequent litigation; and (2) whether there
exists a compelling need for expert opinion testimony in the case.2
The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification to address this
qualified expert testimonial privilege but determined that the Appellate
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.3 As the Connecticut Supreme Court
did not reach the merits of the decision, the Redding court’s reasoning for
and inclination toward establishing a qualified expert testimonial privilege
loom. Consequently, while this issue remains at large in Connecticut courts,
the occasion for the Connecticut Supreme Court to rethink the merits of this
evidentiary privilege awaits another day.
This Note analyzes the balancing test set forth in Redding as applied to
defendant health care providers who participated in the treatment relevant to
malpractice litigation. First, this Note considers whether medical
malpractice plaintiffs present a “compelling need” for the expert testimony
1

Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 181 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Id. at 187–88.
3
See Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 207 A.3d 493, 495 n.1, 511 n.13 (Conn. 2019)
(determining that “[b]ecause the writ of error should have been dismissed for lack of a final judgement,
we do not reach and are not prepared to recognize whether a qualified unretained expert privilege exists”).
2

2020]

THE PRIVILEGED PHYSICIAN

481

of defendant health care providers to overcome the Redding qualified
testimonial privilege. Second, this Note explores whether the Redding
qualified testimonial privilege violates Connecticut’s liberal rules of
discovery as applied to defendant health care providers’ deposition
testimony.
Part I of this Note begins by discussing the risk of losing the expert
opinion testimony of defendant treating physicians in medical malpractice
litigation, addressing Connecticut’s requirements for expert testimony of
treating physicians and the unique role of defendant health care providers.
Part II presents a compelling need for defendant health care providers’
expert testimony in medical malpractice litigation, balancing the rights of
expert witnesses to be free from testifying with the needs of courts and
litigants for their evidence. Part III concludes by challenging the application
of a qualified expert testimonial privilege to the discovery stage of medical
malpractice litigation, considering the practical difficulties imposed by the
Redding privilege and Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery.
I. RISKING THE LOSS OF REQUIRED AND RELEVANT EXPERT EVIDENCE
“Medical malpractice occurs when a . . . doctor or other health care
professional, through a negligent act or omission, causes an injury to a
patient.”4 The negligence at issue might be the result of errors in diagnosis,
treatment, aftercare, or health management.5 Litigating these cases is unique
in that they always involve a particular expert specialty—namely that of the
defendant treating health care provider—and require plaintiffs to produce
expert opinion testimony to support their claims of negligence.
A. Connecticut’s Requirements for Expert Testimony of Treating
Physicians
A jury deciding a case involving a particular expert specialty will
ordinarily require some form of assistance to understand the underlying
facts. The vehicle for providing such assistance is an expert witness—a
person who possesses specialized knowledge that is relevant to the subject
matter of the litigation.6 According to Connecticut’s Code of Evidence, an
expert witness is an individual who has acquired scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge through “skill, experience, training, [or]
education” that “will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or

4

What Is Medical Malpractice?, AM. BOARD PROF. LIABILITY ATTORNEYS,
https://www.abpla.org/what-is-malpractice (last visited Aug. 10, 2019).
5
Id.
6
Daniel W. Shuman, Testimonial Compulsion: The Involuntary Medical Expert Witness, 4 J.
LEGAL MED. 419, 420 (1983).
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in determining a fact in issue.” Health care providers, such as defendants in
medical malpractice litigation, fall within the scope of these expert
qualification standards.
The jury’s need for expert testimony to understand the underlying facts
of medical malpractice cases leaves plaintiffs dependent on the testimony of
health care providers to meet their burden of proof. In the vast majority of
these cases, “a layman does not and cannot have the requisite knowledge as
to whether the proper treatment was given, procedure followed, or care
used.”8 Without the assistance of expert testimony, the jury is therefore
unable to accurately determine three of the four elements at issue in medical
malpractice litigation: the treating physician’s duty to the patient, a breach
of the legal duty, and the cause of the patient’s injury.9
Given the technical requirements for establishing the elements of this
claim, courts have imposed a rule in medical malpractice cases that an expert
health care provider must perform three separate functions. First, to establish
the treating physician’s duty to the patient, “[t]he expert must tell the jury
the standard of skill in the community.”10 Second, to establish a breach of
the physician’s legal duty, the expert must tell the jury “that the defendant’s
conduct failed to meet this standard.”11 Finally, to establish the cause of the
patient’s injury, the expert must tell the jury that the defendant’s failure to
abide by the standard of care “was the proximate cause of the injuries
sustained.”12 If a medical malpractice plaintiff cannot obtain this supporting
expert testimony, then that plaintiff cannot succeed in her claim.
Certain rules apply to medical malpractice litigants in seeking testimony
from an expert with specialized knowledge. Of significance, Connecticut’s
Practice Book requires parties to disclose each person qualified to testify as
an expert witness at trial.13 Connecticut courts have held on several
occasions that “the disclosure requirements of [Connecticut’s] Practice
Book . . . apply with equal force to treating physicians as well as to
independent experts.”14 Even if treating physicians only testify to their care
7

CONN. CODE EVID. § 7-2 (Westlaw through amendments received through May 1, 2019); see also
FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (defining an expert witness as one who has “skill, experience, training, or
education” that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”).
8
Chubb v. Holmes, 150 A. 516, 518 (Conn. 1930).
9
See Robert M. Dombroff, Medical Malpractice in Connecticut, 47 CONN. B.J. 40, 46 (1973)
(stating that “[i]n a medical malpractice action, the successful plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence
of the doctor-patient relationship, (2) a duty upon the physician to protect the patient from injury, (3) a
breach of the legal duty owing the patient, and (4) an injury to the patient with a causal relationship
between the tortious act and the result”).
10
Id. at 49.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-4(a) (West 2017).
14
See Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 323 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added) (stating
that “Practice Book [§ 13-4] employs the term expert witness and does not draw a distinction between
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of the plaintiff, it is well established that litigants must disclose them as
expert witnesses.15 These disclosure requirements therefore apply to all
expert health care providers, regardless of whether they are independently
retained by parties or named as a defendant in medical malpractice litigation.
Once disclosed as experts, defendant treating health care providers are
no longer limited to providing factual testimony. Connecticut’s Practice
Book expressly permits any health care provider who rendered care or
treatment to a party to offer their expert testimony at trial, including any
opinion testimony based upon that physician’s care or treatment or to which
fair notice is given in the disclosed medical records or reports.16
Furthermore, as this Note later explores more deeply, litigants are entitled to
broader access to a treating health care provider’s expert opinion testimony
during discovery proceedings than what is admissible at trial.17
Collectively, the need for expert opinion testimony, the requirement to
disclose treating health care providers as expert witnesses, and the express
authorization for treating health care providers to offer their expert
testimony at trial prompts medical malpractice plaintiffs to depose defendant
physicians in an attempt to discover their expert opinion testimony.
Although plaintiffs in Connecticut medical malpractice litigation have long
relied upon the expert testimony of defendant treating health care providers
in meeting their burden of proof,18 these unretained health care providers
have recently been resisting inquiry into their expert opinion. Upon expert
disclosure, defendant treating physicians now frequently file protective
orders, claiming a privilege from providing their expert opinion. Defendants
may call upon the Redding court’s reasoning in attempt to preclude expert
witness testimony.
B. Privileging the Unique Expert Testimony of Defendant Physicians
Connecticut provides no constitutional or statutory privilege against the
compulsion of expert testimony.19 In the absence of such, privileges are
treating and independent experts”); Bank of Bos. Conn. v. Ciarleglio, 604 A.2d 359, 362 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 608 A.2d 685 (Conn. 1992).
15
Rosenberg v. Castaneda, 662 A.2d 1308, 1310 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
16
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-4(b)(2) (West 2017). E.g., Gemme, 626 A.2d at 325
(discussing plaintiff’s burden “to establish by expert testimony the standard of medical practice regarding
informed consent and the fact that the defendant breached that standard”); Williams v. Chameides, 603
A.2d 1211, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
17
See CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012) (stating that evidence may be elicited at
a discovery deposition even though the information sought will be inadmissible at trial).
18
Gemme, 626 A.2d at 325; see also Williams, 603 A.2d at 1213 (finding that the “plaintiff may
rely on the defendant’s testimony to meet [her] burden of producing positive evidence of an expert nature
from which the jury could reasonably and logically conclude that the defendant was negligent”).
19
Brief of Plaintiff-In-Error-Appellee David R. Salinas at 12, Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of
Redding, 207 A.3d 493 (Conn. 2018) (No. 20054).
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governed by the principles of common law. In Redding, the Appellate
Court for the first time addressed the question of whether an unretained
expert testimonial privilege exists under Connecticut common law.21 Issuing
a groundbreaking decision, the Appellate Court held that Connecticut
recognizes a broad qualified privilege against compelled testimony by
unretained expert witnesses,22 regardless of whether they are familiar with
or unrelated to the facts at issue in a case.
Redding involved an expert appraiser who was neither a party to the
proceedings nor retained by a party.23 Although unrelated to the dispute, the
appraiser had earlier appraised the property at issue and provided his opinion
to banks regarding the value.24 The Redding court granted the unretained
expert’s motion for protective order, prohibiting discovery of the appraiser’s
previously formulated opinion.25 The Appellate Court’s message was clear;
if you want to support your case with expert testimony, you have to pay for
it rather than compel it, even if the expert in question already has familiarity
with relevant case-specific facts.26
Courts have since applied this decision to privilege the opinion
testimony of defendant treating health care providers.27 The basis for
preclusion is that medical malpractice plaintiffs, necessarily equipped with
retained experts of their own,28 are without a compelling need for the
testimony of defendant treating health care providers and therefore fail the

20

CONN. CODE EVID. § 5-1 (West 2019).
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 183 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
22
Id. at 181.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
In determining that an unretained expert privilege exists under Connecticut law, the Redding
court relied primarily on a provision in the Connecticut Practice Book. See id. at 185–86 (identifying a
similarity between the Connecticut Practice Book and a Wisconsin statute that served as a basis for an
unretained expert privilege under Wisconsin law). Practice Book § 42-39 provides in relevant part that
“[a]n expert witness shall not be appointed by the judicial authority unless the expert consents to act.”
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 42-39 (West 2020). The Appellate Court noted that “if a court cannot
compel an expert witness to testify, it logically follows that a litigant should not be able to so compel an
expert . . . [and] implies a privilege to refuse to testify if the expert is called by a litigant.” Redding Life
Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 185–86 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017) (citing Burnett v. Alt, 589
N.W.2d 21, 26 (Wis. 1999)).
27
See Lavoie v. Manoharan, No. CV146027376, 2017 WL 6417834, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
20, 2017) (citing Redding in a decision to privilege opinion testimony of a defendant treating physician);
Order 207.10, Vastarelli v. ProHealth Physicians, NNH-CV-16-6060491-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 9,
2018) (overruling plaintiff’s objection to a protective order privileging opinion testimony of a defendant
treating physician).
28
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (Westlaw through 2019 Supplement to the Connecticut
General Statutes) (requiring medical malpractice plaintiffs to include in their initial filings a certificate
of good faith written and signed by a retained expert health care provider).
21
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second prong of the Redding test. As a result of Connecticut’s recognition
of this privilege, the role of defendant health care providers in medical
malpractice litigation may be reduced to that of a lay witness.30 Unlike lay
witnesses, however, defendant health care providers possess specialized
knowledge and experience pertaining to the facts at issue in the case that
renders their opinion of particular assistance to the trier of fact.31 By limiting
the testimony of defendant health care providers to the facts and
circumstances of their treatment, the Redding privilege would deprive juries
from the assistance of the defendant’s medical opinion in understanding his
or her own care of the plaintiff.
Treating health care providers later named as defendants in medical
malpractice litigation are unique witnesses by virtue of the doctor-patient
relationship which they entered into with the plaintiff. These health care
providers assumed responsibility for the complex process of monitoring,
diagnosing, and treating the plaintiff’s medical condition.32 This process
“involves information gathering and clinical reasoning with the goal of
determining [and resolving] a patient’s health problem.”33 Although the
Redding privilege would allow defendant health care providers to testify to
the factual information gathered in treating the plaintiff, it threatens to
preclude access to the clinical reasoning that the defendant employed in
diagnosing the plaintiff and establishing a plan of care. In other words, a
plaintiff in medical malpractice litigation may not inquire into the standard
of care followed by the defendant health care provider in assessing the
information gathered during treatment.34

29

See Lavoie, 2017 WL 6417834, at *3 (finding that the plaintiffs, who disclosed three experts as
well as the expert who authored the certificate of good faith, will suffer no prejudice in the absence of
the defendant treating health care provider’s expert testimony).
30
See Arnone v. Town of Enfield, 831 A.2d 260, 277 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (“A lay witness
provides facts that are within his personal knowledge without providing his opinion concerning such
facts.”), cert. denied, 837 A.2d 804 (Conn. 2003).
31
See id. at 277–78 (“The test for determining whether a witness is an expert is whether the witness
has any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, that renders his opinion of
assistance to the trier of fact.”).
32
AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OPINIONS ON PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP
§
1.2.6,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-patient-physicianrelationships (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
33
INST. OF MED., COMM. ON DIAGNOSTIC ERROR IN HEALTH CARE, IMPROVING DIAGNOSIS IN
HEALTH CARE
32
(Erin
P.
Balogh
et al. eds.,
2015) (emphasis added),
https://www.nap.edu/read/21794/chapter/4#32.
34
See Lavoie v. Manoharan, No. CV146027376, 2017 WL 6417834, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
20, 2017) (holding that a defendant treating health care provider “cannot be compelled to provide expert
opinion testimony regarding the standard of care, but [can] be questioned about the facts and
circumstances of his treatment of the plaintiffs’ decedent”).
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The standard of care defines the parameters of the legal duty that a health
care provider accepts when treating a patient.35 These standards of care are
recognized by the profession as being acceptable medical treatment by
reasonably prudent health care professionals under like or similar
circumstances.36 In order to abide by their legal duty, a health care provider
must employ clinical reasoning in diagnosing and treating a patient that is in
accordance with the standard of care. 37 At the essence of forming a
doctor-patient relationship, each patient entrusts their treating health care
provider with appreciating and honoring this duty.
Medical malpractice actions are evaluated by the integrity of the
processes that the defendant treating health care provider observed.38 The
integrity of these processes, in turn, is adjudicated by the adherence to
standards of care.39 While plaintiffs in medical malpractice often rely on
retained expert testimony to render new opinions for the purposes of trial,40
such as a breach of the defendant’s legal duty and the cause of the patient’s
injuries, plaintiffs must first establish the applicable standard of care before
assessing liability for medical malpractice.41
The standard of care for medical treatment, however, is elusive since it
may vary among jurisdictions in the United States.42 For example, if a
particular community does not have facilities for emergency surgery,
physicians operating in that community cannot be found negligent for failing
to perform this surgery within the amount of time that might constitute the
standard in a well-equipped urban hospital.43 As practice guidelines often
fail to provide sufficient clarity because of age, conflicting
recommendations, various levels of evidential support, and underutilization
by practitioners, the standard of care is often determined de novo and is a
moving target.44
Without access to defendant treating health care providers’ expert
testimony, this moving target proves difficult for medical malpractice
plaintiffs to pin down. As courts are reluctant to allow plaintiffs to rely on
expert testimony from health care providers within a defendant’s working
group, independently retained physicians are unlikely to be familiar with the

35

Brian K. Cooke et al., The Elusive Standard of Care, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 358,
358 (2017), http://jaapl.org/content/45/3/358.
36
What Is Medical Malpractice?, supra note 4.
37
Id.
38
Cooke et al., supra note 35, at 359.
39
Id.
40
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
41
Cooke et al., supra note 35, at 359.
42
Id. at 363.
43
Id. at 361.
44
Id. at 363.
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resources and capabilities of the facility responsible for the plaintiff’s care.45
The clinical reasoning of defendant treating physicians is therefore
indispensable to establish the range of acceptable treatment modalities
available during the plaintiff’s care. If juries were precluded from
considering defendant treating health care providers’ clinical reasoning as to
their interpretation of the medical facts and choice of available treatment
options, they would not have the technical expertise needed to “distinguish
malpractice (an adverse event caused by negligent care or ‘bad care’) from
maloccurrence (an adverse event or ‘bad outcome’).”46
II. PRESENTING A COMPELLING NEED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The qualified expert testimonial privilege recognized in Redding leaves
unresolved the question of when an expert testimonial privilege should apply
and in what instances it should not. Without further clarification from the
Connecticut courts, its application to medical malpractice litigation would
pose complications.
According to the Appellate Court in Redding, “[t]he appropriate scope
of an expert privilege requires a balance between the right of expert
witnesses to be free from testifying against their will and the needs of the
court and litigants for testimony.”47 In order to determine the proper scope
of the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege, it is therefore pertinent
to assess this balance as applied to defendant treating health care providers
in medical malpractice litigation.
A. Policy Justifications for Defendant Physicians
Courts have recognized two general categories of evidentiary privileges
in common law and delineated the policy considerations justifying their
recognition. The first category includes interpersonal privileges. These
privileges exempt from discovery certain communications between
individuals where there exists an “imperative need for confidence and
trust.”48 Some examples of the circumstances justifying exemption involve
attorney-client, spousal, and psychotherapist-patient communications.49
45
See Hill v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., No. HHDX04CV4034622S, 2008 WL 2802907, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 2008) (precluding the plaintiff from compelling standard of care testimony
from the defendant health care provider’s colleagues).
46
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Med. Liab., Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 109 PEDIATRICS 974, 974 (2002) (citations omitted),
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/109/5/974#ref-4.
47
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 187 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
48
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
49
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387 (1981) (stating that the purpose of
attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communications between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in observance and administration of justice”); see
also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (recognizing that psychotherapist-patient privilege serves
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In these narrow circumstances, courts have found that protecting such
communications “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the
need for probative evidence,”50 and is “essential” to the “satisfactory
maintenance of the [protected] relationship.”51 Furthermore, courts have
stated that “the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial
of the privilege is modest.”52 The assumption is that individuals involved in
these relationships would neither consult with nor divulge this evidentiary
information to a confidant, but for the assurance of confidentiality furnished
by a formal evidentiary privilege.53 Accordingly, the excluded evidence
would not have come into existence without the privilege.54 The limited
recognition of such narrow privileges is the common law’s reaction to
societal demands to encourage and safeguard particular communications.
The second category involves personal privileges. These are privileges
that preclude litigants from compelling an individual to divulge certain
information about oneself. Examples of these exceptional circumstances
include the privilege against self-incrimination,55 the privilege against
revealing one’s political vote,56 and the privilege for a party to a civil action
not to testify if called by his opponent.57
A basis for justifying these personal privileges may be a theory of
promoting the right to informational privacy and freedom from scrutiny.58
“The essence of the right to privacy is control over the dissemination of
information about oneself.”59 However, such instances seem to stand at odds
with the policies underlying our adversarial system and sacrifice a greater
evidentiary benefit than interpersonal privileges. Unlike the interpersonal
privileges, an absence of the protection afforded by personal privileges
would not chill the evidence sought from coming into existence.
Furthermore, personal privileges do not encourage socially desirable
relationships between individuals. This could explain why the privilege
against self-incrimination is limited to the protection of criminal defendants
the public interest of “[t]he mental health of our citizenry, . . . [which] is a public good of transcendent
importance”); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (spousal privilege is based on “the important public interest in
marital harmony”).
50
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.
51
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of
Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
52
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
53
Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 317.
54
See id. at 318 (discussing the chilling effect resulting from the lack of protection over confidential
communications).
55
State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227, 239–41 (Conn. 1984).
56
Mansfield v. Scully, 29 A.2d 444, 449 (Conn. 1942).
57
Banks v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 64 A. 14, 14 (Conn. 1906).
58
Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 325.
59
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 651 (1976).

2020]

THE PRIVILEGED PHYSICIAN

489

and the testimonial privilege for a party to a civil action was eliminated by
Connecticut statute in 1848.60
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege falls within the latter
category of personal privileges. Redding raises questions regarding the
existence and scope of an “involuntary expert privilege.”61 The Appellate
Court explained that “the phrase ‘unretained expert privilege’ . . . mean[s] a
privilege that may be invoked by an expert to prevent the compelled
disclosure of his or her opinion.”62
Justifications for this privilege do not seem to fall within the theory of
informational privacy. Instead, the most compelling basis for this privilege
law is the right to autonomy.63 The time that experts spend in litigation
proceedings is time that is not being spent practicing their chosen profession.
Accordingly, the “physician’s time spent in [legal proceedings] may be less
valuable to society than the physician’s time spent healing the sick.”64 Courts
have similarly reasoned: “We do not force lawyers to provide services to
anyone who walks in the door. We do not force other professionals to
provide their services absent compelling circumstances. We see no reason
to treat experts in a court of law any differently.”65 Thus, proponents of the
Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege suggest that courts should
afford experts latitude to develop their faculties, stressing the social utility
of leaving experts uninterrupted in their specialized role.66
When the expert in question is also a defendant to the litigation, the
justifications for this privilege dissipate. This is commonly the occurrence
of treating health care providers in medical malpractice litigation. In these
instances, the expert witness must spend time in the litigation proceedings—
there exists no right to be exempt from participating.67 Expert factual
witnesses are subject to the same discovery about their knowledge of events
as are non-expert witnesses.68 “The law makes no accommodation for expert
occurrence witnesses even though discovery may be particularly
inconvenient or may entail larger financial loss to an expert than does the

60
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-710 (1902); Banks, 64 A. at 14; C. TAIT & E. PRESCOTT, CONNECTICUT
EVIDENCE § 5.11, at 257 (5th ed. 2014).
61
Brief of Plaintiff-In-Error-Appellee David R. Salinas at 1, Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of
Redding, 175 A.3d 1247 (Conn. 2018) (No. 20054).
62
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 182 n.3 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
63
Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 327.
64
Shuman, supra note 6, at 428.
65
In re Imposition of Sanctions Alt v. Cline, 589 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Wis. 1999).
66
Imwinkelried, supra note 51, at 327.
67
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-178 (Westlaw through 2020 Supplement to the Connecticut
General Statutes) (noting that a party can only compel his adversary to testify “in the same manner and
subject to the same rules as other witnesses”).
68
See id. (noting that a deposition of an “adverse party” must occur “in the same manner and subject
to the same rules as those pertaining to the taking of other depositions”).
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same discovery of non-expert occurrence witnesses.” Furthermore, any
particular witness may be subject to great inconvenience or financial
sacrifice for their time spent in litigation proceedings, “all suffer[ing] the
same relative loss: a day’s wage.”70 “[Y]et the court has power to subject
them to discovery for the same reason it can compel testimony, to promote
the integrity and efficacy of the judicial process of fact-finding.”71
A second potential rationale for the Redding qualified expert testimonial
privilege may be that courts should preclude compelling unwilling experts
based in a theory of unfairness. This theory assumes that “the expert, unlike
an ordinary eyewitness, has no unique knowledge . . . . [Therefore], the other
side, at least in theory, can obtain the same information merely by engaging
[another] expert.”72 This argument rests on the distinction between lay
witnesses and expert witnesses. While “the function of the lay witness is to
testify about the facts relevant to events the witness has perceived,”73 “[t]he
expert’s assistance to the fact finder does not derive from having been at a
particular location, at a particular time, looking in a particular direction.”74
Based on this distinction, litigants have argued that lay witnesses are unique
and irreplaceable and expert witnesses are not.75
“The appeal of this argument turns on the assumption that witnesses are
clearly identifiable as lay or expert.”76 The testimony of an expert defendant
health care provider does depend upon having been at a particular location,
at a particular time, looking in a particular direction. Arguably, the role of a
defendant treating health care provider in medical malpractice litigation is
therefore unique and irreplaceable.77 Furthermore, “[t]he courts assert that
the question of unfairness to individuals should not be controlling, since the
inquiry is directed to one who has been a participant in the occurrence and
withholding relevant testimony by litigants obstructs the administration of

69
Virginia G. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 107 n.147 (1984); see also Baker v. Taco Bell Corp., 163
F.R.D. 348, 350 (D. Colo. 1995) (stating that a treating doctor is an ordinary witness and not entitled to
be paid an expert’s fee for time spent in his deposition).
70
Paul D. Carrington & Traci L. Jones, Reluctant Experts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 59
(1996).
71
Maurer, supra note 69, at 107.
72
Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party’s Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 455, 482–83 (1962); see Shuman, supra note 6, at 430 (stating that “anyone who received similar
education and training could provide the same assistance”).
73
Shuman, supra note 6, at 429.
74
Id. at 430.
75
See id. at 429 (arguing that “lay witnesses are unique and irreplaceable” because “[o]nly those
persons who were in the right place at the right time can now tell us of this past event. No additional
eyewitnesses can be created”).
76
Id. at 430.
77
See id. at 431 (“[T]he expert may have perceived some aspect of the events at issue. Thus, the
expert’s knowledge of the events is unique and not fungible with that of other experts in the field.”).
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justice.” Judicial proceedings rely on accurate knowledge of the past event
to decide an issue correctly that may have resulted in the loss of life, liberty,
or property.79 Such knowledge is uniquely held by defendant treating health
care providers.
A third justification may support the Redding qualified expert
testimonial privilege. Courts have suggested that “compelling expert
testimony would in essence involve a form of involuntary servitude that
should normally not be inflicted upon a person merely because of his
professional expertise.”80 In recognition of this argument, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure offer protection to nonparties to litigation against
subpoena power.81 The Advisory Committee explains that the purpose of
these protections is the recognition that compelling an unwilling witness to
provide an expert opinion implicates the individual’s intellectual property
rights.82 “Arguably the compulsion to testify can be regarded as a ‘taking’
of intellectual property.”83 As the Second Circuit stated, discretion in these
matters should be informed by factors such as “the degree to which the
expert is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the
case . . . [and] the difference between testifying to a previously formed or
expressed opinion and forming a new one.”84
This justification for the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege
evaporates in instances where the expert is also a defendant party and
participant to the events giving rise to the litigation. In medical malpractice
litigation, “the [defendant health care provider] is merely being required to
provide testimony authenticating work already performed and opinions
already voluntarily rendered.”85 There seems to be no difference in principle
between compelling experts to produce a document in their possession and
compelling them to testify to information that lies within their knowledge,86
regardless of whether such information is factual or opinion in nature.
Furthermore, courts and commentators have rebutted the takings argument,
noting that experts have no generally recognized property rights to their own
knowledge.87
78

Anderson v. Florence, 181 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Minn. 1970).
Shuman, supra note 6, at 427.
80
Ondis v. Pion, 497 A.2d 13, 18 (R.I. 1985).
81
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) (West 2013).
82
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to 1937 adoption (West 2013).
83
Id.
84
Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822 (2d Cir. 1976).
85
Brief of Defendant-In-Error/Appellant Town of Redding at 13–14, Redding Life Care, LLC v.
Town of Redding, 175 A.3d 1247 (Conn. 2018) (No. 20054). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2203,
at 137 (1961) (the expert who was asked to testify was not “render[ing] a professional service,” but was
“asked merely, as other witnesses are, to testify as to what he knows or believes”).
86
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2193, at 74 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
87
Maurer, supra note 69, at 108; see also Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 821 (“To clothe all such expert
testimony with privilege solely on the basis that the expert ‘owns’ his knowledge free of any testimonial
easement would seal off too much evidence important to the just determination of disputes.”).
79
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Considering the needs of medical malpractice litigants for the unique
expert testimony of defendant health care providers, these defendants
require more compelling policy interests to justify the Redding privilege
exempting discovery of their expert opinion.
B. The Needs of Courts and Litigants
In light of the technical nature of medical malpractice litigation, the
requirement of expert opinion testimony, and the unique role of defendant
health care providers, medical malpractice plaintiffs will suffer an undue
burden in proving their prima facie case when courts apply the Redding
qualified expert testimonial privilege to defendant treating health care
providers.
In the field of medical malpractice litigation, a court will not ordinarily
permit a plaintiff to have a jury deliberate on the case unless an expert
provides supporting testimony.88 As the law currently stands, courts are
likely to protect unwilling health care providers who are strangers to the
subject treatment being litigated from being compelled to testify.89 In these
instances, health care providers who provided no treatment to the plaintiff
in a medical malpractice litigation will have formed no prior opinion as to
that treatment. Not only would these experts who are strangers to litigation
be required to become familiar with the relevant facts and formulate new
opinions, compelling these non-treating health care providers to testify
would require them to opine on the treatment of other health care providers
or colleagues—a circumstance that the Connecticut Superior Court
expressly sought to prevent.90 Due to the courts’ preference against
compelling testimony of non-treating expert physicians, any concession to
the interest of defendant health care providers will detriment the plaintiffs’
interests in seeking necessary testimony from qualified experts.91
Testimony from defendant treating health care providers does not raise
these same concerns. Familiar with the treatment at issue in litigation,
defendant health care providers can provide their expert opinion without the
imposition of additional study or preparation. Furthermore, the more
specialized a particular medical field and the more limited the specialists, a
88

Shuman, supra note 6, at 421.
Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 820–21, 824 (precluding a litigant from compelling an expert “to express
an opinion about facts of which [they] ha[ve] no personal knowledge” or cases in which they are an “utter
stranger[] to the subject matter of the litigation”).
90
Hill v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., No. HHDX04CV-4034622S, 2008 WL 2802907, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 30, 2008) (considering policy reasons such as imposing a “heavy strain on relationships
in health care facilities when one health care provider is required to make a public assessment under oath
about another’s professional performance”); Drown v. Markowitz, No. CV054010740, 2006
WL 2604986, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2006) (prohibiting a litigant from compelling opinion
testimony from a health care provider as to “anyone except herself”).
91
Shuman, supra note 6, at 421.
89
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litigant’s need for expert testimony becomes ever more compelling. In such
circumstances, the defendant health care provider may be the only feasible
option for plaintiffs in proving their medical malpractice claim.
Nevertheless, the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege presumes to
exempt their testimony unless courts find an exception.
Whether the “courts will compel cooperation of an expert, either at trial
or in pretrial discovery, varies with the relationship of the expert to the
parties and to the facts of the case.”92 Many of the earliest cases
distinguished between the ordinary expert witness and occurrence expert
witnesses, resolving this issue by generally compelling expert testimony of
occurrence expert witnesses.93 The occurrence expert witness is the expert
present at some phase of the event at issue.94 The defendant in a medical
malpractice action who witnessed the events giving rise to the litigation falls
within this category of experts.
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice present a compelling need for the
opinion testimony of defendant treating physicians, as these occurrence
experts are unique and irreplaceable. Not only do treating health care
providers possess specialized skill and knowledge that may be helpful to the
trier of fact, they perceive first-hand the events that are pertinent to litigation.
These specialized witnesses may be “called upon to fill three possible roles
during discovery and at trial, namely, those of an adverse party, an
eyewitness, and an expert witness.”95 The Redding test threatens to sever the
third role from this list.
If the Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege were to apply to
defendant treating health care providers, courts would deprive a medical
malpractice litigant of the clinical reasoning and medical judgment
employed by defendants in assessing the information gathered during
treatment. It is impractical to obtain opinions on the same subject by other
means, as their opinions are uniquely informed by their real-time
involvement in the events at issue. The needs of the jury and the courts to
consider the opinions formed contemporaneously with the defendant
physician’s treatment provide medical malpractice plaintiffs with a
compelling need to preserve this testimony from being privileged.
III. VIOLATING CONNECTICUT’S LIBERAL RULES OF DISCOVERY
The United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “[f]or more than
three centuries[,] it has . . . been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the

92

Maurer, supra note 69, at 81.
Shuman, supra note 6, at 434. E.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 389–90 (1875); Bd. of
Comm’rs v. Lee, 32 P. 841, 841–42 (Colo. App. 1893).
94
Shuman, supra note 6, at 434.
95
Anderson v. Florence, 181 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. 1970).
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public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.” This maxim, though, is not
absolute. In exceptional circumstances, courts have also recognized
evidentiary privileges that excuse certain individuals from giving testimony
or producing documents. Privileges are established only in instances in
which “exclusion [of relevant evidence] is thought to further some other
societal interest more important than accurate judicial factfinding.”97 These
evidentiary exclusions are “grounded in a substantial individual interest
which has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the
public interest in the search for the truth.”98
Adhering to the preference for admitting relevant evidence, courts are
reluctant to craft evidentiary privileges. Due to the inhibiting role that
privileges play in our judicial system’s search for truth, they “are not lightly
created nor expansively construed.”99 Accordingly, courts examine various
claims of privileges “start[ing] with the primary assumption that there is a
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any
[privileges] which may exist are distinctly exceptional.”100
There has been significant disagreement by courts as to which
circumstances give rise to sufficient justifications for excluding evidence
from judicial factfinding. The United States Supreme Court (U.S. Supreme
Court) endeavored to resolve the disagreement with the authority Congress
granted to it under the Rules Enabling Act.101 The U.S. Supreme Court
considered codifying evidentiary privileges to bring unity and consistency
to the law.102 Throughout this great debate as to which evidentiary privileges
are prevalent enough to put into code, a testimonial privilege personal to
expert witnesses was without mention.
An Advisory Committee that the Court appointed promulgated thirteen
proposed rules to determine when courts should recognize evidentiary
privileges.103 The Advisory Committee drafted rather elaborate rules that
established precisely what circumstances permitted invocation of a

96

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)).
97
Shuman, supra note 6, at 428; see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (“Exceptions from the general rule
disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified, however, by a ‘public good transcending the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’” (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980))).
98
State v. Andrews, 726 A.2d 104, 110 n.21 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331–32).
99
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), superseded by statute on other grounds, FED.
R. EVID. 104(a); PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 330 (2004) (finding
that the privilege should be construed strictly).
100
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (citing Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331).
101
Act of June 19, 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
102
Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 636.
103
Id. at 615, 655 n.255 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
501 through 513).
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privilege. In response, “[a] storm of controversy arose after the Supreme
Court promulgated the Proposed Rules, and no other portion of the rules
encountered more criticism than the article dealing with testimonial
privileges.”105 The question of how to treat testimonial privileges proved to
be especially controversial throughout the judicial and legislative branches
in formulating these new rules of evidence.106 “Rather than permit[ting] the
proposed rules to become effective automatically, Congress passed a bill
requiring affirmative congressional approval of the Rules before they could
take effect.”107
Since it was clear that no agreement was likely as to the content of
specific privilege rules proposed by the Court,108 Congress intervened in
response to the intensified public dissension and widespread hostility.109
Congress ultimately resolved the issue by eliminating all of the Court’s
specific rules on privileges and substituting a single rule in their place—Rule
501.110 Rule 501 provides that privileges shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States “in the
light of reason and experience.”111 Congress’s intervention in adopting this
Rule has been “understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a
privilege . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis” by trial
judges.112
The enactment of Rule 501 is revealing. First, it displays that “neither
[the adopted Federal Rules of Evidence] nor the proposed rules on privilege
. . . contain any suggestion that an expert enjoys either an absolute or a
qualified privilege against being called by a party against his will.”113 In
consideration of the societal interests found, through centuries of experience,

104

Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 637.
Id. at 638.
106
Id. at 615.
107
Act of Mar. 30, 1973, An Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers by suspending
the effectiveness of the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, the amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
transmitted to the Congress by the Chief Justice on February 5, 1973, until approved by Act of Congress,
Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973); Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 636.
108
S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6 (1974).
109
Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 615.
110
FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment; S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 11
(1974); A Bill to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings: Hearing on H.R. 5463
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 356–57 (1974) (amendments by the House Judiciary
Subcommittee to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
111
FED. R. EVID. 501.
112
FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment; S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13
(1974); see also Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 640–41 (“[A] number of influential individuals and
groups stridently insisted that the concept of codifying federal evidence law itself was a grave mistake;
they argued that evidentiary issues should be worked out on a case-by-case basis by trial judges.”).
113
Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 818 (2d Cir. 1976).
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to outweigh the public interest in the search for the truth, such a privilege
was not of concern.
Second, the enactment demonstrates two policy issues that have
dominated the debate over privileges: (1) the extent to which a testimonial
privilege substantially protects the liberties of the individual rather than
simply setting up a roadblock to the factfinding functions of the trial process;
and (2) the extent to which trial judges should be granted deference in
determining privileges.114 Ultimately, Congress decided that overarching
rules governing the privilege of evidence risk a disparate impact on litigants
and that the ruling on privileges is best left to the informed discretion of trial
court judges.
A. Practical Difficulties for Trial Judges
The practical implications of the Redding qualified expert testimonial
privilege remove substantial discretion and flexibility from trial court
judges. No longer are trial court judges to consider the determining factors
set forth in previous Superior Court cases—whether an expert previously
formed an opinion and whether the expert is testifying as to events in which
he or she was previously involved.115 Such factors have traditionally had
significant influence on the determination of privileges as applied to treating
health care providers in medical malpractice litigation. Furthermore, the
privilege set forth in Redding presents trial court judges with the complicated
task of distinguishing between factual and opinion testimony of medical
expert witnesses. Given these practical implications of the Redding test, it
would undoubtedly impose undue burdens on parties in medical malpractice
litigation.
As the law currently stands, parties may file protective orders asking the
court to preclude opposing counsel from compelling opinion testimony from
disclosed experts.116 These orders may specify the extent of protection
necessary in the circumstances of that case, tailoring each order to strike a
proper balance between the needs of litigants and experts. Absent a qualified
expert testimonial privilege, these means of protecting litigants from undue
114

Krattenmaker, supra note 59, at 646.
See Drown v. Markowitz, No. CV054010740, 2006 WL 2604986, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug.
18, 2006) (prohibiting a litigant from compelling opinion testimony from a health care provider as to
“anyone except herself”). See also Baker v. Mongelluzzo, No. UWYCV126016555S, 2016 WL 9462318,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 28, 2016) (holding that the expert “may not be compelled to give . . . opinion
testimony regarding treatment by other health care providers . . . [but] may be questioned concerning
opinions he already formulated, as expressed in medical records”); Hill v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp.,
No. HHDX04CV-4034622S, 2008 WL 2802907, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 2008) (considering
policy reasons such as imposing a “heavy strain on relationships in health care facilities when one health
care provider is required to make a public assessment under oath about another’s professional
performance”).
116
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-5 (West 2012).
115
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discovery provide judges with the necessary flexibility and discretion to
fairly administer trials.
Connecticut’s Practice Book grants courts the authority to issue these
protective orders under broad circumstances.117 It provides, in relevant part,
“for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.”118 The party that seeks a protective
order under Connecticut’s Practice Book bears the heavy burden of
establishing the requisite “good cause.”119 The rules are clear; no court
orders shall be made unless justice demands a party’s protection. In its
determination of whether good cause is shown to justify precluding a party’s
access to information in discovery proceedings, “the court is obligated to
take a reasoned and logical approach to the relevant contest between the
parties.”120 The trial court’s discretion to rule on a protective order “applies
to decisions concerning whether the information is material, privileged,
substantially more available to the disclosing party, or within the disclosing
party’s knowledge, possession or power.”121
Under the Redding test, the trial court could no longer consider these
traditional factors of “good cause” in determining whether to privilege
expert opinion testimony. Instead, courts would be required to make this
determination based on the expectations of the expert witness—a
consideration difficult to tangibly ascertain.122 Additionally, the party
moving for a protective order would no longer bear the “heavy burden” of
precluding discovery of relevant evidence. The qualified expert testimonial
privilege, as recognized in Redding, presumes the privilege to apply to all
unretained experts.123 The party seeking disclosure, therefore, would bear
the burden of establishing “a compelling need” for the expert’s opinion
testimony.
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege may also prove
complicated for judges to effectively apply. In medical malpractice
litigation, “it is difficult to distinguish between fact and opinion, as is often
experienced by trial judges endeavoring to adhere to the rule prohibiting

117

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
119
Babcock v. Bridgeport Hosp., 742 A.2d 322, 355 (Conn. 1999); TelAid Indus. v. Tricomm Grp.,
Inc., No. 064006190, 2007 WL 586783, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007).
120
TelAid Indus., 2007 WL 586783, at *2.
121
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503, 508–09 (Conn. 1983) (emphasis added).
122
See Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 187–88 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017)
(stating that courts should consider “whether [the expert] reasonably should have expected [to] be called
upon to provide opinion testimony in subsequent litigation”).
123
Id. at 187.
118

498

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

eliciting expert-opinion testimony from a defendant [treating health care
provider].”124
Precluding inquiring into all matters they deem to be of “an expert
nature”—anything other than the actual care and treatment of the health care
provider—presents the issue that what one party considers to be expert
questioning will not be the same as what the other party considers to be
expert questioning. As there is no credible way to separate the health care
provider’s actual treatment from his or her specialized background, it is an
arbitrary distinction to call a health care provider a mere “fact witness” as
opposed to an “expert witness.”125 “The doctor’s knowledge of the proper
medical practice and [their] possible awareness of [their] deviation from that
standard in the particular case are, in a real sense, as much matters of ‘fact’
as are the diagnosis and examination [the doctor] made or the treatment upon
which [the doctor] settled.”126
Because of this, when courts preclude all questioning of “an expert
nature” at the deposition of a treating health care provider, lawyers argue
over the nature of the questions.127 Such confusion over the nature of
questions creates significant expense and delay, and litigants cannot
complete depositions until the court issues a decision on the propriety of
each question.128 Furthermore, “[r]igid application of the fact/opinion
distinction might result in the exclusion of the physician’s testimony about
perception cast in opinion terms.”129

124

Anderson v. Florence, 181 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 1970); see also Shuman, supra note 6, at
433 (“Although experts may be compelled to testify to their perceptions in factual terms, it is likely that
in the area of their expertise, their factual perceptions will be interwoven with their opinions.”).
125
See Herman Edgar Garner, Jr., Opinion and Expert Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 36 LA.
L. REV. 123, 125 (1975) (“The theoretical distinction between fact and opinion leads to confusion in the
courts and is criticized severely by scholars.”).
126
Anderson, 181 N.W.2d at 878.
127
For a sampling of these debated questions, see Lavoie v. Manoharan, No. CV146027376, 2017
WL 6417834, at *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2017) (“[D]id the standard of care require that you
perform an initial general psychiatric evaluation of [the decedent?]”). See also Plaintiffs’ Objection to
Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order at Exhibit A, Vastarelli v. ProHealth Physicians, NNH-CV-166060491-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 18, 2018) (“[I]f [a Doppler/ultrasound] is negative, does that rule out
a pulmonary embolism?”; “What are the ways available to you to rule out a pulmonary embolism?”;
“How would you characterize the findings on the chest x-ray and the lower extremity Doppler?”; “Do
you have an understanding as to why [a physician] ordered the Doppler?”; “What is a normal O2
saturation?”; “Would it give you any concern if [the patient] had shortness of breath walking?”).
128
See Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 207 A.3d 493, 508 (Conn. 2019) (suggesting
that parties “make a record of the specific questions that seek allegedly privileged information, and then
request a further ruling from the trial court on particular questions”).
129
Shuman, supra note 6, at 438–39; see also Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
895, 935 (1976) (“An expert’s testimony as to the facts that he observed, moreover will often indicate
his expert opinions and conclusions.”).
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To avoid the substantial difficulty that trial judges will face in
determining whether the testimony in question is fact or opinion,130 the
Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege should not apply to treating
health care providers in the discovery stage of medical malpractice litigation.
Otherwise, courts may inadvertently preclude discovery of admissible
evidence to the detriment of litigants in their search for justice.
B. Connecticut’s Liberal Rules of Discovery
Connecticut’s rules of discovery allow significantly greater access to
information than the rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial.131
So long as parties have reason to believe that their discovery requests may
lead to admissible evidence, they are entitled to the discovery of such
evidence. The Redding test seems to ignore the distinction between the
discovery of evidence and the admissibility of such evidence at trial. As a
result, the Redding qualified expert privilege may deprive medical
malpractice litigants of expert testimony from treating health care providers
that can help direct the discovery of relevant and admissible evidence.
The purpose of discovery is to minimize the likelihood and effects of
unfair surprise at trial and to provide an informational basis for factfinding
and analysis at trial or for fair settlement of the dispute.132 Connecticut’s
Practice Book entitles parties to liberal discovery of information. This rule
informs the courts that “[d]iscovery shall be permitted if the disclosure
sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and
if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially
greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking
disclosure.”133 This open exchange of information is the fuel that powers the
adversarial system. Without it, the search for truth and justice would come
to a grinding halt.
The qualified testimonial privilege recognized in Redding is not limited
to the admissibility of an unretained expert’s opinion at trial. Instead, the
Redding privilege would preclude a medical malpractice litigant from
pretrial discovery of a treating health care provider’s opinion testimony as
130

See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 416 (1952) (“[F]ew rules have caused
the courts more trouble than their legalistic struggle to determine whether the testimony in question is
fact or opinion.”).
131
See Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., Inc., 491 A.2d 389, 392 (Conn. 1985); Milliun v. New
Milford Hosp., 20 A.3d 36, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 80 A.3d 887 (Conn. 2013); CONNECTICUT
PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012) (stating that evidence may be elicited at a discovery deposition even
though “the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”).
132
Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 456–57 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The policy which
prompted amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) . . . to allow more liberal discovery of potential expert testimony
was not merely for convenience of the court and the parties, but was intended to make the task of the trier
of fact more manageable by means of an orderly presentation of complex issues of fact.”).
133
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012).
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well. In consideration of the liberal rules of discovery, the medical opinion
of treating health care providers should be discoverable. Obtaining such
information would assist a medical malpractice plaintiff in gathering the
specialized evidence required for a prima facie case and could guide the
plaintiff’s discovery of such relevant information from non-treating expert
physicians retained for litigation. Additionally, obtaining equivalent medical
opinion testimony from a non-treating expert imposes substantial burdens of
time and expense on a medical malpractice plaintiff. A defendant treating
health care provider can surely offer such testimony with substantially
greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by a plaintiff.
To uphold and protect this system of liberal discovery, Connecticut has
set forth Rules of Professional Conduct governing the role of lawyers in the
exchange of information. These rules hold lawyers to a standard of honesty
and cooperation to promote accurate and open disclosure. “Fair competition
in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against . . . concealment
of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in
discovery procedure, and the like.”134 Without such Rules of Professional
Conduct, the adversary system would not function fairly nor would it lead
to just results.
“[A]lmost all the limits upon advocacy specified in . . . the Rules of
Professional Conduct are designed to protect the integrity of the justice
system,”135 such as by regulating the discovery of information. In particular,
the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that: a lawyer shall not
“[u]nlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value.”136 Commentary makes it clear that this rule also concerns obstructive
tactics in discovery procedure, “such as at a deposition, by which an attorney
improperly seeks to hamper a party in its effort to obtain evidence.”137
Lawyers’ attempts to preclude parties from discovery of information create
inefficiencies, generate expenses associated with obtaining alternative
evidence, and limit the examination of information that may be critical to
the case. For these reasons, conduct that interferes with the discovery system
is per se sanctionable.
In reference to Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery, the Appellate
Court refused to identify an absolute testimonial privilege for treating
physicians.138 The Appellate Court found that “a categorical rule permitting
134
Faile v. Zarich, No. HHDX04CV065015994S, 2009 WL 3285986, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept.
10, 2009).
135
Id. at *8; 2 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 65.6, at 65–11 (3d ed. Supp.
2007).
136
CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(1) (Westlaw through amendments received May
1, 2019).
137
Faile, 2009 WL 3285986, at *7.
138
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 183 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017);
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treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition is not in harmony with
our liberal discovery rules” and “finds no support in our appellate
jurisprudence or our long history of trial practice.”139 In refusing to adopt an
absolute expert privilege, the Appellate Court considered the potential abuse
of this power—namely, allowing litigants to argue that information is
privileged even if the expert witnesses themselves do not claim protection
from disclosing their opinion testimony.140 Accordingly, the Appellate Court
noted that “[e]ven if [the court] were to assume, arguendo, that there was
such a privilege [of expert witness testimony], it would be personal to the
witnesses and not within the scope of any party’s rights to assert.”141 The
Appellate Court’s dictum and the Rules of Professional Conduct emphasize
this potential abuse by attorneys and ensure that any claim of privilege by
experts must be made personally and based on their own unwillingness to
provide opinion testimony.
Connecticut courts have explained that “[t]he rules of discovery are
designed to make a ‘trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical
extent.’”142 In pursuit of this goal and in the administration of justice, “courts
must have the power to discover and compel the disclosure of evidence.
Otherwise truth can be concealed and justice can be thwarted at the whim of
anyone who prefers not to divulge what he knows.”143 The question here is:
to what extent does the power to compel disclosure of evidence allow access
to a defendant treating health care provider’s expert opinion testimony?
C. Restricting Discovery in Medical Malpractice Litigation
While Connecticut rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial
permit any health care provider who rendered care or treatment to a party to
offer their expert testimony,144 Connecticut rules governing the discovery of
evidence allow for significantly greater access to information.145 These rules
Milliun v. New Milford Hosp., 20 A.3d 36, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 80 A.3d 887 (Conn. 2013).
139
See Milliun, 20 A.3d at 51 (holding that nonparty physicians could be compelled to testify as
expert witnesses regarding the bases for medical opinions they previously formed after treating).
140
See id. (noting that the court “fail[ed] to see how the defendant has any standing to assert the
witnesses’ rights”).
141
Id.
142
Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 476 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (citing
United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)).
143
United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
144
E.g., Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); see also Williams v.
Chameides, 603 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (“[The] plaintiff may rely on defendant’s
testimony to meet its burden of producing positive evidence of an expert nature from which the jury
could reasonably and logically conclude that the defendant was negligent.”).
145
See Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., Inc., 491 A.2d 389, 392 (Conn. 1985) (noting that “the
allowable scope of inquiry at a discovery deposition clearly exceeds the boundaries of admissible
evidence”); Milliun v. New Milford Hosp., 20 A.3d 36, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 80 A.3d 887
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lie at the heart of Connecticut’s liberal discovery system and stand at odds
with the Redding court’s qualified expert testimonial privilege.
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege departs from
Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery in several respects. First, the
Redding privilege does not distinguish between the discovery and
admissibility of expert testimony.146 Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery
depend upon this distinction to minimize the likelihood and effects of unfair
surprise at trial and to provide an informational basis for factfinding. By
precluding discovery of a defendant treating health care provider’s expert
opinion, medical malpractice plaintiffs would be substantially limited in the
information they are able to consider in preparing and litigating their claim.
Second, consistent with the Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding that
courts should decide whether to grant an expert testimonial privilege on a
case-by-case basis,147 the Connecticut rules grant trial judges the discretion
to issue protective orders once litigants disclose treating health care
providers as experts. In such instances, it is the party seeking the protective
order that bears the heavy burden of proof. The Redding qualified expert
testimonial privilege shifts this burden, requiring the party seeking
disclosure to demonstrate a compelling need and that the witness reasonably
expected to provide expert testimony in subsequent litigation.148 The burden
that the Redding test places on litigants seeking disclosure creates, in effect,
“a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a
deposition [that] is not in harmony with our liberal discovery rules.”149
Third, Connecticut’s rules of discovery place the use of protective orders
and the extent of discovery within the discretion of the trial judge.150 This
discretion allows trial judges to tailor discovery in a manner that strikes the
proper balance between a litigant’s need for testimony and a witness’s
protection from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, and
expense. Unlike the Redding privilege that excludes all testimony of an
“expert nature,” Connecticut’s rules of discovery authorize trial judges to
designate the particular scope and manner of discovery in consideration of
the facts in dispute.151
Finally, the policy considerations set forth in Connecticut’s rules of
discovery underlying the granting of protective orders do not justify
precluding discovery of defendant treating health care providers’ opinions.
(Conn. 2013); CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2 (West 2012) (stating that evidence may be elicited
at a discovery deposition even though “the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”).
146
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 183 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
147
Town of Thomaston v. Ives, 239 A.2d 515, 518 (Conn. 1968).
148
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding, 165 A.3d 180, 181 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
149
Milliun, 20 A.3d at 51 (holding that nonparty physicians could be compelled to testify as expert
witnesses regarding the bases for medical opinions they previously formed after treating).
150
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503, 508 (Conn. 1983).
151
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-5 (West 2012).
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Treating health care providers possess direct knowledge and familiarity
regarding their care and treatment of a party. This knowledge includes
information with respect to the condition of the party at the time they
rendered such treatment, as well as the party’s prognosis for future
treatment, all of which is material to the litigation. Furthermore, treating
health care providers have the luxury of relying on, in addition to their
education, training, and experience in their specialized fields, their
examinations of the patient’s medical histories, present condition, and
response to treatment. The unique position of these treating health care
providers offers knowledge of parties’ injuries that is superior to any other
non-treating health care provider. Because of this, they are in the best
position to testify to the applicable standard of care for the treatment of the
party, departures from that standard of care, and the causal relationship
between those departures and the injuries suffered by the party.
Possessing such personal knowledge and experience, treating health
care providers may therefore provide expert opinion testimony without the
imposition of additional study, preparation, undue burden, or expense. As
the Second Circuit has recognized, states generally “compel[] experts to
testify to opinions which they are able to give without study of the facts or
other preparation,” precluding such testimony only when experts are asked
to “express an opinion about facts of which . . . [they] ha[ve] no personal
knowledge” or cases in which they are “utter strangers to the subject matter
of the litigation.”152 In fact, the law is settled that medical malpractice
plaintiffs may rely on the defendant treating health care provider for
testimony regarding the standard of care.153 Precluding inquiry into a
treating health care provider’s opinions would substantially impede the
evidentiary obligations of a party in proving their claim and would interfere
with the relevant contest between parties in accessing information.154 Such
information is not substantially more available to the plaintiffs, for it is
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Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820–21, 824 (2d Cir. 1976). See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that “though [the court] cannot require [an expert witness]
to conduct any examinations or experiments to prepare himself for trial, it can require him to state
whatever opinions he may have previously formed”); see also CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-2
(West 2012) (stating that a party may obtain discovery of material information which is “within the
knowledge, possession or power of the . . . person to whom the discovery is addressed”).
153
See Williams v. Chameides, 603 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that, “[t]he
plaintiff may rely on the defendant’s testimony to meet its burden of producing positive evidence of an
expert nature from which the jury could reasonably and logically conclude that the defendant was
negligent”); see also Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
154
See Order 134.30, Sabetta v. Guilford Family Practice, NNH-CV-15-6058837-S (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov.14, 2016) (compelling expert testimony of defendant treating physician under the liberal rules
of discovery in Practice Book § 13-2); see Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503, 510 (Conn.
1983) (finding an abuse of the court’s discretion in denying the plaintiff opportunity for discovery of
information which the “court had already recognized . . . was necessary”).
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uniquely held within the knowledge, possession, and power of a treating
health care provider.155
The Redding privilege presents a substantial departure from
Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery. Plaintiffs in complex and
specialized cases such as medical malpractice litigation depend on expert
testimony to succeed on their claim and have utilized Connecticut’s liberal
rules of discovery to meet their burden of proof with the expert opinions of
treating health care providers. The Redding privilege would unduly impede
medical malpractice plaintiffs in their search for the expert evidence that the
law requires. In an adversarial system designed to promote the search for
truth and access to justice, the Redding court’s qualified expert testimonial
privilege violates Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery as applied to
treating health care providers.
CONCLUSION
The Redding qualified expert testimonial privilege as applied to
defendant treating health care providers would impose an undue burden on
litigants involved in medical malpractice actions. Given the requirement for
expert testimony in complex cases of medical malpractice and litigants’
demand for the unique expert opinion of treating health care providers, a
compelling need for the expert testimony of defendant treating physicians is
likely to outweigh an expert party’s need for protection. Furthermore,
applying this privilege to preclude defendant health care providers from
offering their opinion testimony during discovery depositions would result
in practical difficulties imposed on courts and litigants alike, in turn
violating Connecticut’s liberal rules of discovery. Accordingly, if the
Redding privilege is reestablished in the Connecticut courts, trial judges
should find exception to the applicability of this qualified expert testimonial
privilege to defendant treating health care providers. Such an exception
would be necessary to avoid inaccuracies in judicial factfinding and
impediments to justice in medical malpractice litigation.
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See C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Compelling Expert to Testify, 77 A.L.R.2d 1182 § 2 (1961)
(“An expert may be compelled to testify as to a matter of fact within his knowledge, notwithstanding that
such knowledge may have been acquired as the result of special study, learning, skill, or experience.”);
see also Celentano v. Home Ins. Co., No. CV91 03 42 27S, 1992 WL 335759, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 5, 1992) (compelling expert testimony of a witness who observed the mechanism of plaintiff’s
injuries as it would be “impracticable for the plaintiff to obtain facts and opinions on that subject by other
means”).

